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Abstract 
 
 
This paper investigates the loan pricing of risk in a market with short term leases 
(hotels) relative to longer term leases (office properties) with respect to how news 
on the economy, capital and real estate markets is incorporated in loan pricing 
using a vector autoregression (VAR) framework. The hotel loan pricing data 
provides a unique laboratory to study loan pricing adjustments given the short-
term nature of the hotel leases. We examine the information content of hotel 
credit spreads in two stages. After establishing the impact of economic variables 
on loan pricing and the informational content of the incremental risk spread, we 
next examine how loan pricing adjusts in response to expected delinquencies.  We 
find that improvement in general economic conditions, an increase in forward 
looking corporate profitability, an increase in capital availability and/or an 
increase in the demand for hotel services forecast a decline in the hotel risk 
premium differential. Thus, the relative loan prices—the spread—reflect 
systematic risk. We also find that hotel spreads themselves contain important 
economic information. Unexpected increases in hotel spreads predict hotel 
delinquencies. In other words, lenders appear to set interest rates on hotel 
mortgages in anticipation of hotel delinquencies and foreclosures in future 
periods. Lenders do not appear to consider past delinquencies in their setting their 
rate. 
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Introduction 
 
 This paper takes advantage of a natural laboratory offered by hotel financing to study the 
loan pricing in a market with short term leases (hotels) relative to longer term leases (office 
properties) with respect to how news on the economy, capital and real estate markets is 
incorporated in loan pricing. In obtaining financing for hotels, the contract interest rates for hotel 
mortgages substantially exceeds those reported for other property types. We study whether the 
difference in loan pricing in the two markets is systematically priced by fundamental factors. 
The argument that lenders advance is that underwriting hotel property is a cross between a 
business loan and a real estate loan because hotels constantly sell their rooms at the prevailing 
market rates e.g., rooms are essentially marked to market on a daily basis. A question which thus 
arises is whether this higher interest rate contains important information regarding the market 
conditions. In other words, is it justified and is it informative? Further, is it possible to find 
forward looking factors of the spread in hotel interest rates that will allow hotel investors and 
lenders to take appropriate action in advance of the rate shift? A related question involves 
whether real estate lenders set hotel interest rates based on expected credit risk.
1
  
 The objective of this paper is to address the informational content of the spread.
2
 Using 
spreads at the time of loan origination (SATO) for mortgage loans by property type from 
Lehman Brothers (July 1998 – January 2008) and Cushman Wakefield Sonnenblick-Goldman 
(February 2008 – March 2011) we examine the time-series movements in the average spread.  
Our study spans a variety of economic conditions including expansions and contractions thus 
                                                 
1
For example, Morgan and Ashcraft (2003) find that interest rate spreads on loans are very good predictors of future 
loan performance (loan default risk) and rating downgrades for banks. In other words, interest rate spreads as good 
forward-looking measures of risk. As a result of their findings, the authors propose that regulators should consider 
basing capital requirements on loan interest. 
2
Prior studies on credit spreads have focused on one of three issues. These issues are 1) the relation between the risk 
free rate or its term structure and the credit spread, 2) the credit spread puzzle arising from the fact that the default 
risk isn’t as variable as the credit spread over time, and 3) do asset prices correctly reflect and in turn are impacted 
by fundamental economic factors. We focus on the latter issue in the current study. 
 3 
making use of a long time-series of spreads. The time span of the analysis is important because it 
allows us to subsume a variety of economic events. As Shiller and Perron (1985) and Shiller 
(1989) show, increasing the number of observations by sampling more frequently while leaving 
the total time span of the data unchanged may not increase the power of tests very much
3
.  
 Given the significant time variation in the credit spreads, we explore their informational 
content. Prior research on the role of asset prices in signaling future economic conditions and 
propagating economic fluctuations has emphasized the information content of corporate spreads 
as default risk indicators and indicators of future economic activity. For example, Philippon 
(2009) theoretically shows that as credit spreads rise, the supply of funds start to contract which 
results in falling asset prices and consequently an increase in the likelihood of default as the 
equity in deals narrows. 
          We explore the information content embedded in the hotel credit spread including whether 
this risk premium is systematically priced by fundamental factors and additionally if it possesses 
forecasting ability for future loan performance. Thus, we study the pricing in a market with short 
term leases relative to pricing in a market with longer term leases. A VAR framework is used 
which allows for the mutual impact of inter-dependent economic time series. The prior literature
4
 
indicate that higher credit spreads for commercial mortgages i.e., differences between mortgage 
rates and Treasury Bond rates with the same maturities should exist for more volatile property 
types and property types with more investment flexibility i.e., property that can be expanded or 
renovated. Similar results should also obtain if the differential risk premia i.e., difference in the 
                                                 
3
If two time series make relatively slow movements through time (a common feature for economic data then a long 
time series (spanning many years) is needed before the true joint tendencies of the two variables can be measured 
reliably. Shiller (1989) stresses the argument that obtaining many observations by sampling frequently (say, through 
weekly or even daily observations) does not appreciably increase the power to measure the joint relationship 
between the two time series if the data span a total of only a few years. 
4
Titman, et al (2005) investigates what are the determinants of credit spreads for commercial mortgages. Credit 
spreads are defined as differences between mortgage rates and Treasury Bond rates with the same maturities. 
 4 
interest rate on hotels and office property types is investigated in lieu of credit spreads using a 
transitive logic process. 
          Our empirical results are consistent with the prior literature. In particular, hotels have 
higher spreads relative to offices since they are not only riskier but also have greater adjustment 
costs (investment flexibility given higher and more frequent capital expenditures for hotels). The 
relatively short lease maturity associated with hotels should make hotels more sensitive to 
changes in fundamental factors which in turn should increase the loan pricing of risk of hotels 
relative to that of offices. Our study finds that this is the case with the differential risk premium 
systematically priced. In other words, loan pricing -- the spread -- reflects systematic risk and 
can be seen as a compensation for systematic risk factors. This is the first distinguishing feature 
of our study. Fundamental factors that account for this systematic pricing of the hotel risk 
premium differential include general economic conditions, expected corporate profitability, real 
estate capital availability and the demand for hotel services. An increase in these variables is a 
bellwether to a decline in the hotel risk premium differential. We also find that the interest rate 
spread has important economic information for forecasting loan delinquencies. An increase in 
the loan spread (risk premia differential) has forecasting power for predicting an increase in loan 
delinquencies. However, the converse situation doesn’t hold e.g., the risk premium differential 
does not increase in response to a shock in delinquencies. In addition to our main finding that 
risk premia predicts loan delinquencies, we also find a parsimonious set of economic variables 
that has predictive power for delinquencies. We find that an increase in the risk differential 
(measured as the difference in standard deviation of returns on hotels and office properties) 
forecasts increase in delinquencies. A positive shock to expected earnings forecasts, indicating 
higher expected future predictability, forecasts a decrease in delinquencies, albeit after a longer 
 5 
lag. Finally, an increase in unemployment, a variable that captures economic conditions, 
forecasts an increase in delinquencies. However, even after we control for the effect of these 
financial and economic variables on delinquencies in our VAR process, the risk premium 
differential remains an important variable for forecasting a change in delinquency levels. This is 
the second distinguishing feature of our study. 
 
Why Analyze Differential Risk Premia? 
 
Components of Interest Rates 
 
          There are several underlying factors that influence the movement of interest rates
5
. The 
first component is the nominal risk-free interest rate which consists of the real rate of interest and 
the expected inflation premium. The second component is a market risk premium for risky assets 
that reflects uncertainty. Lenders require additional interest to compensate for increased risk. A 
third component is the term structure of interest rates. The longer the term of the loan, the higher 
the rate is in general. The final component is the idiosyncratic risk premium which is specific to 
a particular investment, in the current study, hotel properties.  Figure 1 shows the incremental 
interest rate components for hotels. The area in blue represents the nominal interest rate on 10-
year constant maturity Treasury bond which includes the real rate of interest and the inflation 
premium. Gilchrist et al (2009) argue that longer-maturity credit instruments such as 10-year 
treasuries are probably better at reflecting anticipated future economic conditions one to two 
years ahead. The area in red denotes the risk premium for office properties. The interest rate on 
office properties is higher than yields on Treasuries of comparable maturities because of implicit 
default risk among other factors. The spread over Treasuries also reflects the systematic factors 
                                                 
5
See Liu and Quan (2010) for a general discussion of factors driving the hotel investment discount rate 
 6 
that drive all real estate property types including the general real estate market factor (risk 
premium), compensation for the general illiquidity of the commercial real estate market, 
transaction costs, tax treatment, and other imperfections in the commercial real estate market 
among others.  In other words, the area in red can also be thought of the risk adjustment that is 
systematic in nature in addition to the idiosyncratic risk associated with offices. The final 
component in yellow represents the difference between hotel and office interest rates. We will 
hereafter refer to this idiosyncratic risk premium for hotels as the risk premia differential i.e., risk 
of hotels relative to office properties. This idiosyncratic risk premium varies by approximately 
58 basis points (.584%) on average over the course of our study. 
 
Symbiotic Relationship between Office and Hotel Property Types  
 
          A question which arises is why the focus on the idiosyncratic risk premium for hotels 
relative to office properties? What is so special about office properties? Why not use some other 
property type such as retail which uses percentage leases
6
 which gives landlords a call option on 
the economy in good times and a base rent in bad times. For one, several professional hotel 
advisory services such as Cushman & Wakefield
7
 as well as HVS
8
 have found that a historical 
relationship exists between occupied office space and room night demand although this 
relationship tends to vary by city. Consequently, occupied office space is a useful indicator of 
anticipated room-night demand.  Table 1 shows that approximately .42 room nights is generated 
per year for every 1,000 square feet of occupied office space per year on average while Figure 2 
provides a graphical depiction of this relationship over time for the U.S. as a whole. According 
                                                 
6
A percentage lease is a lease whose rental is based on a percentage of the monthly or annual gross sales made on 
the premises. Common types of percentage leases include a fixed minimum rent plus a percentage of the gross, a 
fixed minimum rent against a percentage of the gross, whichever is greater; and a fixed minimum rent plus a 
percentage of the gross, with a ceiling to the percentage rental among others. 
7
For example, Cushman and Wakefield (2008) found that for Washington, D.C. approximately 263 room nights are 
generated per year on average for every 1,000 square feet of occupied office space per year. 
8
HVS finds that a strong correlation also exists between office supply and hotel supply. 
 7 
to Fuller, et al (2008), this relationship exists since corporate travelers are one of the three major 
sources of hotel demand.  
          Another reason for choosing the office property type as a benchmark within which to 
compare hotels with respect to interest rate deals with lease characteristics, a source of fixed 
time-invariant differences in interest rates (fixed effect
9
). Longer leases characterize office 
properties while a short-term 24-hour lease is typical for hotels. Greater uncertainty of future 
cash flows is associated with short-term leases which in turn require a greater premium (higher 
borrowing cost) to compensate for this risk. Sivitanidou and Sivitanides (1997) argue that 
differences in lease length could also induce different income growth expectations. In particular, 
smaller rental changes tend to correspond to longer leases while shorter lease allow owners to 
take advantage of rent increases as the result of improving market conditions. The short term 
nature however also makes hotels more prone to shocks in the capital market factors (e.g., stock 
returns) and the general economy. Figure 3 displays risk premia differential plotted with the 
difference in standard deviations of hotel and office returns. The difference in standard 
deviations is positive, indicating that hotels have higher risk than office properties.   
 Another related fixed effect to consider is adjustment costs or investment flexibility i.e., 
property that can be expanded or renovated. Typically hotels require higher capital expenditures 
(also known as planned improvement programs or PIPs in hotel parlance) relative to offices 
given the higher tenant turnover which is a function of the length of the lease. Thus lenders may 
require a risk premium to compensate for greater adjustment costs. Intuitively, the interest rate 
on the office property type is analogous to a risky long term straight bond with the interest rate 
on hotels resembling a long term straight bond plus an option. 
                                                 
9
Please see Sivitanidou and Sivitanides (1997) for a more complete discussion of some of the potential fixed effects 
or differentials. 
 8 
 
Spreads relative to Treasury 
 
          A related question is why not focus on the differences between mortgage rates and 
Treasury bond rates as in the prior literature (see, for example, Nothaft and Freund (2003), Maris 
and Segal (2002), and especially Titman, et al (2005))? By looking at the differential in interest 
rates between hotel and office property types, we already control for factors that systematically 
impact all property types to a similar extent such as general real estate market (e.g., overall real 
estate risk premium), capital market (e.g., credit spread of corporate bonds), and general 
economic conditions regardless of whether they are observable or not. Consequently, we are 
better able to study idiosyncratic traits that elicit differential risk premia between property types. 
Working with measures in terms of differentials is an important feature of our study.  
 
Data and Methodology 
 
Data 
 
          The average spread for a property type over Treasury at the time of loan origination 
(SATO) for mortgage loans for hotels and office property types, is obtained from Lehman 
Brothers for the period starting July 1998 through January 2008. We update the SATO data using 
Cushman Wakefield Sonnenblick-Goldman survey of indicated spreads
10
 for conventional 
commercial mortgage loans over a 10-year Treasury bond beginning in February 2008 and 
ending in March 2011. This gives us a relatively long time series that encompasses both the 
times of economic growth and the times of economic distress (recessions). We therefore are able 
to study the informational content of the spread in a variety of economic conditions. The Lehman 
data is normalized for loan size and loan to value to capture the true difference in SATO by 
                                                 
10
According to Christopher T. Moyer at Cushman & Wakefield, the rate ranges are based on general rate indications 
from lenders for those asset classes, recent quotes, and closed transactions. 
 9 
property type while the Cushman data is not.
11
 The Cushman data is used since the Lehman data 
was discontinued with the collapse of Lehman Brothers.  Wall Street analysts use SATO as a 
measure of default risk e.g., default models use loan specific SATO as one of the key 
performance drivers. The intuition for using SATO as a default metric is that the yield spreads 
(interest rate – risk free rate) for various property types include two options, default risk (put 
option) and prepayment risk (call option). Prepayment risk for commercial mortgages is often 
minimized through ―lock out‖ provisions or ―yield maintenance‖ requirements which reduce the 
value of the call option while the value of the put option (default) remains unchanged. We 
subtract the SATO corresponding to office from the SATO for hotels to obtain the differential 
risk premia at time t (SATOHotel,t – SATOOffice,t). The differential risk premia (incremental risk 
premium for hotels over and above office properties, see the shaded yellow band in Figure 1) is 
our variable of interest. A positive risk premia differential suggests higher risk including greater 
default (delinquency) risk since the hotel loan is made at a wider spread relative to an office loan.  
          The macro-economic variables we examine include percent change or growth rate in 
expected corporate earnings per share on the S&P500 (PCTEPS), growth rate in total 
employment (EMPL), and the rate of unemployment (UNEMPL). The addition of the growth 
rate in expected earnings per share are included since they do not only represent Wall Street’s 
consensus on the expected movements in the economy but also partly reflect corporate 
management’s short term expectations12. Since most overnight stays are business related and 
corporations plan their travel in advance, expected earnings are used as anticipated demand 
                                                 
11Prior studies have also used SATO data that hasn’t been normalized. For example, the ACLI data on loan 
commitments made by life insurers that Nothaft and Freund (2003) use in their study are also not standardized for 
changes in terms and maturities. We do not use the ACLI data in the current study since it is quarterly while the 
Cushman and Wakefield data are monthly. In addition to this, hotel loans are not necessarily made in each quarter 
by insurance companies. 
12Analysts typically form their expectations of earnings per share after conference calls with a firm’s management 
and the announcement by management of forward looking earnings. 
 10 
instrument.
13
 Expected earnings should also reflect future disposable income growth; the leisure 
demand market segment depends heavily on disposable income. Finally, news about future 
corporate earnings could also reflect corporate borrowers’ shocks to their ability to pay debt in 
the future. Our rationale for including expectation variables is that if markets are efficient then 
credit spreads should reflect expectations in addition to realizations. A capital market variable 
used is the difference in the standard deviation of total returns on Hotel REITs (real estate 
investment trusts) and Office REITs (DIFFSTDEV). The difference in the standard deviations is 
our proxy of the additional riskiness in performance of hotel REITs over and above office REITs 
that the stock market participants anticipate over a twelve month period. Collin-Dufresne et al 
(2001) use the implied volatilities of near-the-money options on the OEX(S&P100) index to 
proxy for changes in a firm’s future volatility in their study of credit spreads.14 Previous 
corporate bond studies have often used stock returns to proxy for changes in a firm’s health. In 
an analogous manner, we use volatility of REIT returns as a metric of the uncertainty about 
future returns on a property type. Titman and Torous (1989) indirectly show that greater 
variability of property values increases the likelihood of default in circumstances where the 
unpaid loan amount exceeds property value. REIT returns are used given the greater frequency 
(monthly) of values relative to underlying property values which are typically reported on a 
quarterly basis. In addition to this, REIT returns contain market expectations (are forward 
looking) for a given property type in contrast to underlying property values. The volatility of 
hotel REITs should exceed office REIT volatility given the higher frequency of rent resetting of 
the former due to shorter lease term, ceteris paribus. Hotel property values should thus adjust 
                                                 
13
Wheaton and Rossoff (1998) use GDP as their primary demand instrument. We do not use GDP our study since it 
is not forward looking. Besides this, GDP is published quarterly and revised monthly. 
14
The authors use noncallable, nonputtble debt of industrial firms in contrast to our study wherein mortgages contain 
both a call and a put option. 
 11 
more quickly relative to office values which are subject to existing contract rents on longer term 
leases. The real estate variable of interest is the incremental delinquency rate for hotels relative 
to office properties (DELINQ). The incremental delinquency rate is a useful indicator of the 
volume of distress hotel loans percolating. In sum, we study a system with several variables 
capturing the state of the economy and the demand for hotel services. The variables include 
expected earnings per share, the unemployment rate and/or the growth rate in employment, 
which are all metrics that influence either discretionary income or the perception of financial 
security.  Appendix A gives a description and source(s) of each of these variables.  
 
Vector Autoregression Model (VAR) 
          To analyze the information content of the incremental credit spread for hotels as well as 
the information contained in our macroeconomic variables measuring activity in the economy as 
a whole, the capital markets and the real estate markets, we employ a vector autoregression 
(VAR) model. Vector autoregressions are a useful and flexible way of analyzing economic 
relations in a time series data. More specifically, the VAR allows for the mutual impact of the 
variables; it is thus well suited for inter-dependent economic time series. In other words, the 
technique is useful in examining complex relationships among variables when the variables are 
serially correlated. Typically, VARs have little serial correlation in the residuals. This is helpful 
for separating out the effects of economically unrelated influences in the VAR. All variables in a 
VAR are treated equally by including for each variable, an equation explaining its evolution 
based on its own lags and the lags of all other variables in the model. An example of a simple 
vector autoregression for two variables ty  and tz follows: 
z
ttztzzt
y
ttytyyt
zyz
zyy


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11
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 where y , z , y , z , y and z are parameters and the epsilons (
y
t , 
z
t ) are white noise. 
Thus, the VAR recognizes that variables can have an impact on other variables. VAR generalizes 
easily to more variables and more lags of variables. In the current setting, we use the VAR model 
to reveal the evolution of the credit spread and the macroeconomic variables as well as the 
dynamic interactions between these variables.  
 
Results 
Stage 1: Economic Dynamics of the Spread 
  Our initial point of departure is an analysis of the variation in the relative spread. There is 
a substantial time series variation in the differential risk premia (incremental risk premium for 
hotels over and above office properties) as seen in the shaded yellow band in Figure 1. What 
economic, market, and industry variables account for time series variation in the spread in a 
parsimonious model? This is an important question for understanding loan pricing in the real 
estate market. Our variable of interest is the relative cost of capital (spread) between the market 
with relatively short leases and the market with longer leases. Understanding the behavior of the 
spread will result in better understanding of the connection between economic and market 
conditions and relative pricing in real estate markets with different effective lease durations. Our 
investigation proceeds in several steps, as we relate the risk premia differential to factors that can 
account for the sources of variation in the higher risk premia. We employ a sequential process to 
determine whether the existing variables in our VAR system remain relatively stationary and 
continue to forecast the spread as well as to ascertain if our newly introduced factors. 
 We start by estimating a simple VAR system that includes two variables, risk premia 
differential and risk differential, 
 13 
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Figure 4 Panel A shows the impulse response functions for this VAR system. The left graph 
shows that an increase in risk differential forecasts an increase in risk premia differential. 
Therefore, risk premia responds to risk. The right panel shows a response in differential risk 
measure to an increase in risk premia differential. A higher risk premia differential forecasts an 
increase in risk differential. A feedback loop thus exists between the risk premia differential and 
the differential risk metric. 
 As a robustness check, we re-estimate the VAR by adding a measure of economic 
conditions, the unemployment (UNEMPL), to the financial measure of risk differential. Inclusion 
of the unemployment variable does not change the previously reported results. Figure 4 Panel B 
shows impulse response functions for this VAR system. We find that the differential in risks and 
unemployment both have an important affect in the risk premia differential. 
 Having established the connection between the risk premia differential and several 
economic variables in a simple setting, we now proceed to incorporate more variables 
simultaneously in a parsimonious model.  
 We estimate a VAR system that includes five variables: (1) risk premia differential 
(RISKDIFF); (2) a measure of corporate profitability—a percent change in forward earnings per 
share (PCTEPS); (3) risk differential measured as the difference in standard deviations 
(DIFFSTDEV); (4) unemployment rate (UNEMPL); and (5) CMBS issuance as a proxy for 
capital supply conditions. Figure 5 shows impulse response functions for the response in risk 
premia differential to a change to variables in the system. The results indicate that the risk 
 14 
premia differential is autoregressive (first row, left graph), the risk premia differential falls when 
higher earnings are expected (first row, right), an increase in risk results in higher risk premia 
differential (second row, left), and an increase in unemployment represents a deterioration of 
economic conditions and forecasts an increase in risk premia differential.
15
 We also find that a 
positive shock in CMBS issuance, indicating an inflow of funds through a higher CMBS 
issuance and increasing capital availability, results in a lower risk premia differential.  
 Next, we add two variables that measure the demand for hotel services into our existing 
VAR system. The hotel industry variables are total hotel revenues (HOTREVYR) and total hotel 
demand (HOTDMNDYR). We also exclude two existing variables - risk differential 
(DIFFSTDEV) and unemployment rate (UNEMPL) – from the system. The rationale is that 
DIFFSTDEV and UNEMPL could contain the same information as a more direct measure of 
hotel industry performance proxied by HOTREVYR and HOTDMNDYR. We will explore this 
relationship more fully in a subsequent VAR impulse response function analysis. The impulse 
response functions (IRFs) for this VAR system are shown in Figure 6.  
 Figure 6 reveals that all of our existing variables in our previous VAR system continue to 
behave in a similar manner. The risk premia differential series is still autoregressive. The risk 
premium charged for hotel loans declines when aggregate earnings environment is expected to 
improve and as funding becomes available through CMBS issuance and capital supply increases. 
There are also several new insights in Figure 6. The third graph in the first row indicates that an 
increase in hotel revenues forecasts a drop in risk premia charged. The third row of Figure 6 
shows the response of total hotel revenues (HOTREVYR) to the variables in the system. The 
first graph indicates that a shock to risk premia differential does not forecast a change in total 
                                                 
15
 To check robustness of the results to the unemployment shock, we estimate the same system but replace the 
unemployment variable with the employment variable (percent change in total employment). We find that our 
results are robust to this change.  
 15 
hotel revenues. The second panel indicates that a shock to expected corporate profitability 
(PCTEPS) forecasts an increase in hotel revenues. This is consistent with economic intuition that 
hotel revenues are related to business activity. The third panel in the third row captures 
autoregressive nature of the hotel revenues. The fourth panel shows that hotel revenues are 
related to hotel demand, as expected. The fourth row of Figure 6 shows the response of total 
hotel demand (HOTDMDYR) to the variables in the system. The results are similar to the results 
for total hotel revenues. In particular we find that risk premia differential does not forecast total 
hotel demand; and we find that forward EPS forecasts hotel demand. The fifth row of Figure 6 
shows the response of CMBS issuance to the variables in the system.  
 To summarize our new findings: (1)  We find that forward looking corporate profitability 
measure (PCTEPS) forecasts demand for hotel services (HOTREVYR and HOTDMNDYR); and 
(2) risk premia differential has no power to forecast the hotel demand variables (HOTREVYR 
and HOTDMDYR). 
 We next examine the information content incorporated in DIFFSTDEV and UNEMPL 
relative to HOTREVYR, a more direct metric of hotel industry performance. The new VAR 
system includes not only the difference in standard deviations (DIFFSTDEV) and unemployment 
(UNEMPL) as a measure of economic conditions but also hotel revenues (HOTREVYR). Other 
variables included in the system are percent change in forward EPS (PCTEPS), activity in the 
hotel CMBS market (CMBSISSU), and our variable of interest, the risk premia differential 
(RISKDIFF).  
 Plots of the impulse response functions (IRFs) associated with our new system are shown 
in Figure 7, Panel A for the Risk Premia Differential to a unit standard deviation change in a 
particular variable in the system, traced forward over a period of 12 months. This system 
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captures very well the economic dynamics established through the previous analysis. The results 
are consistent with our prior findings regarding the autoregressive nature of the risk premia 
differential and the respective roles that improved corporate profitability and increasing CMBS 
issuance play in lowering the risk premium. The new insight of these plots is that when a direct 
measure of conditions in the hotel market – hotel revenues (HOTREVYR) – is included in the 
system, the significance of the two other risk variables declines. The risk differential 
(DIFFSTDEV) and unemployment (UNEMPL) are no longer significant at 5% level (although 
they remain significant at the 10% level). In other words, using a direct measure of industry 
performance, hotel revenues, subsumes the informational role of the less direct measures (risk 
differential and unemployment).   
 In Figure 7, Panel B we plot impulse response functions (IRFs) for the Risk Differential 
(DIFFSTDEV) to a unit standard deviation change in a particular variable, traced forward over a 
period of 12 months. There are several results of interest to note. An increase in expected 
profitability (forward earnings) forecasts a decline in risk differential. The risk differential picks 
up movements in unemployment; an increase in unemployment forecasts an increase in risk 
differential. An increase in hotel revenues forecasts a significant decline in risk differential. 
Overall, the results suggest that the risk differential variable contains both information on the 
economy (unemployment) and industry-specific information. When a direct measure of industry 
performance (hotel revenues) is included in the VAR system, it captures the role of less direct 
performance measures. The analysis indicates that the risk differential variable also captures well 
a variety of state variables, including information on overall economic conditions 
(unemployment) and industry performance.  Thus, the inclusion of the risk differential variable 
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represents a parsimonious way of reflecting information that is important for modeling the 
variation in the spread.   
  In this section we studied the dynamics of the spread. We find that the behavior of the 
spread is consistent with economic intuition and we establish that the differential risk premium is 
systematically priced. The spread responds to a set of economic variables that contains a measure 
of financial risk (DIFFSTDEV), a forward looking measure of financial performance (PCTEPS), 
a measure of overall economic conditions (unemployment, UNEMPL),  a measure of capital 
supply conditions in the industry (CMBSISSU), and industry specific performance information, 
captured by hotel revenues (HOTREVYR). These variables thus capture risk and return 
information in the risk premia differential (spread). 
 
Stage 2: Informational Content of the Spread 
 To study the informational content of the pricing spread we begin with univariate 
analysis. In efficient capital markets, prices reflect market expectations of risk and return. 
Markets anticipate future developments and adjust prices for risky assets (the required rate of 
return on capital) when expected conditions change. In this environment, the risk premia 
differential may contain important information that is useful for forecasting delinquencies and 
foreclosures.  
 We begin by adopting a flexible approach and estimating a VAR system with risk premia 
differential (RISKDIFF) and delinquency (DELINQ) variables. The VAR system we estimate is, 
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In accordance with the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Schwarz Bayesian information 
criterion (BIC), we estimate the VAR system with 2 lags. Figure 8 plots impulse response 
functions (IRFs) for this VAR system. The left panel indicates that the risk premia differential 
does not increase in response to a shock in delinquencies (the zero level is within the standard 
error band, so the response in to statistically different from zero). In other words, past 
delinquencies do not forecast increases in the interest rate differential. The right panel indicates 
that a shock to the risk premia differential forecasts an increase in delinquencies with a lag of 
approximately three months (the right panel of the figure shows a significant positive response). 
These results are consistent with efficient markets: market prices anticipate future deterioration 
in cash flows, rather than respond to them with a lag. Our findings thus indicate that the risk 
premia differential contains important information regarding future relative levels in 
delinquencies. 
 We also report the results of the regression of the risk premia differential (RISKDIFF) on 
the past level of relative delinquencies in the hotel and office mortgage-backed securities 
(DELINQ). Lagged values of the dependent and independent variables are included to control for 
serial correlation in the data.     
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019.0018.0930.0042.0 
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The Durbin-Watson statistic is 2.05. The variable of interest is tDELINQ . The regression 
coefficient for this variable is not significant. We also estimate this regression with the lagged 
delinquency variable (we perform regressions with 1tDELINQ , or 2tDELINQ ). The results are 
similar. These results are consistent with the results from the VAR (Figure 8, left panel). 
 Next, we estimate the following regression, 
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The Durbin-Watson statistic is 1.66. The variable of interest is the lagged measure of the risk 
premia differential ( 2tRISKDIFF ); the other variables are included in the regression to control 
for serial correlation. The results suggest that the risk premia differential is a predictor of the 
relative level of delinquencies. The results of this regression are consistent with the results from 
the VAR (Figure 8, right panel). We find that risk premia differential contains important 
information for predicting delinquencies.  
 To check the robustness of the above result, we include more lags and estimate the 
regression, 
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The Durbin-Watson statistic is 1.99. The variable of interest is the lagged measure of the risk 
premia differential (RISKDIFFt-2). The coefficient for this variable is positive (1.54) and 
significant (t-statistic of 2.79), confirming our results. 
 
Multivariate Analysis 
 Having established that the risk premia differential has predictive power for 
delinquencies in a single variate setting, we proceed with multivariate analysis. Our goal is to 
explore inter-temporal associations between loan delinquencies, economic and financial 
conditions, and risk premia differential. We estimate the following VAR system, 
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In accordance with the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Schwarz Bayesian information 
criterion (BIC), we estimate the VAR system with 2 lags. 
 We now examine the impulse response functions (IRFs) for the VAR system. The top 
row of graphs in Figure 9 shows the response of the risk premia differential to shocks in the state 
variables. The first panel (top row, left graph) shows that a shock to the risk differential forecasts 
a positive change to risk premia differential – a higher risk differential forecasts a higher 
incremental compensation for risk. The second graph in the top row shows that a shock to 
forward expected EPS results in a lower risk premia differential. This result is consistent with the 
view that during relatively good times – higher earnings – the spreads narrow. The next panel 
indicates that a shock to unemployment forecasts an increase in the risk premia differential. The 
last figure in the top row shows the response of the risk premia differential to a shock in relative 
 21 
delinquencies. The impulse response function indicates that the risk premia differential does not 
increase in response to past delinquencies. 
 We now examine the second row of Figure 9. It plots IRFs for delinquencies as a 
response variable. The first figure indicates that in a multivariate VAR system a shock to the risk 
premia differential forecasts an increase in delinquencies. This is our main result. It shows that 
when the effect of other financial and economic variables on delinquencies has already been 
taken into account in a system, the risk premia differential remains an important variable 
forecasting a change in delinquency levels. The next graph in the bottom row shows that an 
increase in risk differential forecasts an increase in delinquencies. This result provides a 
connection between risk as measured by financial market variables and future delinquencies. 
Another financial variable in the system is forward EPS. A shock (an increase) to a forward EPS 
forecasts a decrease in delinquencies, albeit after a longer lag. Finally, the last plot shows that a 
shock to unemployment forecasts an increase in delinquencies.  
 Given our results in a VAR setting, we next perform multivariate time series regressions. 
Results of the regressions are reported in Table 2. Each column represents a different regression 
specification. The dependent variable is the level of delinquencies, DELINQt. Lagged values of 
the dependent variable and of the independent variables are included in the regressions to control 
for serial correlation in the data.  
 The first specification includes the following explanatory variables: risk premia 
differential
16
 (RISKDIFFt-6), difference in risk (DIFFSTDEVt-4), and unemployment (UNEMPLt-
8). Our findings are consistent with the VAR analysis. First, we find that the risk premia 
differential is an important variable for forecasting delinquencies. In the regressions, the risk 
                                                 
16
 The lag structure for the explanatory variables is suggested by the results of the VAR analysis, after considering 
the significance levels in the impulse response functions. 
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premia differential (RISKDIFFt-6) has a positive coefficient (coefficient value of 1.146, t-statistic 
of 2.01) indicating that an increase in the risk premia spread forecasts an increase in 
delinquencies. Second, we find that an increase in risk, as captured by the difference in standard 
deviations (DIFFSTDEVt-4), forecasts an increase in delinquencies. Third, we find that 
worsening economic conditions - as captured by the unemployment variable - predicts an 
increase in delinquencies.  
 The second specification differs from the first specification in two ways. We study the 
difference in risk variable with a longer lag (DIFFSTDEVt-6) and we use the percent change in 
total employment (EMPLt-9) instead of the unemployment variable. The results of this 
specification are fully consistent with the results from the first specification. 
 In the third specification (Table 2, third column) we add a forward looking financial 
variable to the regression. We include the percent change in forward S&P500 earnings per share. 
We find that this variable is not significant in forecasting delinquencies, but the behavior of other 
predictors does not change after we control for this forward-looking financial measure. 
 Overall, the results of time series regressions are fully consistent with the results from 
VAR analysis and indicate that differential risk premia for hotels is an important variable for 
forecasting hotel delinquencies. 
 
Conclusion 
          We use a two stage process to investigate how the length of the lease contract affects the 
pricing of loan risk. Shorter term leases such as those associated with hotels e.g., a room for a 
night should exhibit a greater sensitivity to changes in fundamental factors which in turn should 
increase the loan pricing of risk (higher interest rates) on this property type relative to longer 
term leases associated with other property types such as office real estate where the rents are 
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fixed over a longer time horizon say five to ten years e.g., these leases can’t be marked to market 
instantaneously. Using a VAR framework, we thus examine the dynamics of the incremental 
hotel risk premium (hotel interest rate – office interest rate) to assess the extent to which 
fundamental factors are incorporated into the loan pricing of hotels. These factors include the 
state of the economy, expected corporate profitability, as well as capital market and real estate 
market conditions. Next, we examine the signaling implications of widening or tightening 
incremental hotel risk premium. 
          We find that the differential risk premium for hotels is systematically priced. This is the 
primary contribution of our study. In particular, a deterioration of general economic conditions, a 
decline in expected corporate profitability, a reduction in capital availability and/or a decrease in 
the demand for hotel services are catalysts resulting in a rise in the hotel risk premium 
differential.  We also show that changes in the risk differential and unemployment incorporate 
information on the direction of hotel revenues, a direct measure of industry performance. In 
addition to this, we demonstrate that the relative risk premia of hotel rates above office property 
rates contains important information for forecasting hotel delinquencies. However, the converse 
situation doesn’t hold e.g., the risk premium differential does not increase in response to a shock 
in delinquencies. Hotel credit spreads widen when lenders anticipate higher hotel delinquencies 
and narrow during expected hotel prosperity. We also find that an increase in the volatility of 
hotel REIT returns or risk (as measured by standard deviation of returns) and a change in 
economic conditions as captured by unemployment have forecasting power for hotel 
delinquencies and foreclosures. More importantly, even when we control for the effect of other 
financial and economic variables on delinquencies in our VAR model, the risk premium 
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differential remains an important variable for forecasting a change in delinquency levels. This is 
our main result in the second stage. 
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Appendix A 
Variable Description and Source of Data 
Delinquency rate (DELINQ) Percentage of loans 30+ days delinquent or in foreclosure for 
hotels minus the percentage of loans 30+ days delinquent or in 
foreclosure for offices. Source: Trepp 
Difference in Standard 
Deviation (DIFFSTDEV) 
The difference in the standard deviation of total returns on 
Hotel REITs (real estate investment trusts) and Office REITs. 
To calculate the standard deviation for each property type a 
rolling twelve month window is used on the total return series 
for a given REIT property type. DIFFSTDEV = Hotel – Office. 
Source: National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts
17
 
Differential Risk Premia 
(RISKDIFF) 
Difference in the spread at time of origination (SATO) between 
hotel and office property types; additional risk premia 
associated with hotel. Source: Lehman Brothers, Cushman & 
Wakefield (http://www2.cushwake.com/sonngold/)  
Percent Change (Growth 
Rate) in Total Employment 
(EMPL) 
Change in the number of employed persons from period to 
period. Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) (via 
http://www.economy.com/freelunch) 
Percent Change in Forward 
Earnings per Share (PCTEPS) 
PctEPS = (EEPSt/EEPSt-1) – 1. Where EEPS is Forward 
Earnings per Share, analysts estimates of earnings per share for 
the S&P500. This is anticipated profits in contrast to actual 
corporate profits (see Corporate profits (PROFITS). Source: 
http://www.yardeni.com 
Unemployment rate 
(UNEMPL) 
Number of unemployed persons divided by the labor force, 
where the labor force is the number of unemployed persons plus 
the number of employed persons. Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS) (via http://www.economy.com/freelunch)  
Hotel Revenues Year-over-
Year (HOTREVYR) 
Year over year percentage change in total hotel revenues (all 
hotel classes). Source: Smith Travel Research 
Hotel Demand Year-over-
Year (HOTDMDYR) 
Year over year percentage change in total hotel demand (all 
hotel classes). Source: Smith Travel Research 
CMBS Issuance trailing 
twelve months (CMBSISSU) 
Trailing twelve months CMBS Issuance. Source: CRE Finance 
Council, Compendium of Statistics
18
 (original source of data is 
Commercial Mortgage Alert) 
                                                 
17
http://www.reit.com/IndustryDataPerformance/IndustryDataPerformance.aspx  
18
http://www.crefc.org/uploadedFiles/CMSA_Site_Home/Industry_Resources/Research/Industry_Statistics/CMSA_
Compendium.pdf  
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Figure 1. Incremental Interest Rate Components for Hotels 
 
 
 
Source: Federal Reserve, Cushman & Wakefield Sonnenblick Goldman, Lehman Brothers
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Table 1: Annual Historic Office and Hotel Statistics for the U.S. 
 
 
 
                 Source: CoStar, Smith Travel Research  
 
 30 
Figure 2: Historical Relationship between Office and Hotel Occupancies for the U.S. as a whole 
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 31 
 32 
Figure 4 
In Figure 4, Panel A we plot impulse response functions (IRFs) for the Risk Premia Differential and difference in 
standard deviations (DIFSTDEV) to a unit standard deviation change in a particular variable, traced forward over a 
period of 12 months. Response to Cholesky 1 standard deviation. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence bands. 
Panel B contains IRFs for a VAR system that adds unemployment. 
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Figure 5 
In Figure 5 we plot impulse response functions (IRFs) for the Risk Premia Differential to a unit standard deviation 
change in a particular variable, traced forward over a period of 12 months. Response to Cholesky 1 standard 
deviation. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence bands. The VAR system contains five variables: (1) risk premia 
differential (RISKDIFF); (2) a percent change in forward earnings per share (PCTEPS); (3) risk differential 
(DIFFSTDEV); (4) unemployment rate (UNEMPL); and (5) CMBS issuance. 
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Figure 6: Risk Premia and Industry Conditions 
In Figure 6, we plot impulse response functions (IRFs) for the Risk Premia Differential to a unit standard deviation change in a particular variable, traced forward 
over a period of 12 months. Response to Cholesky 1 standard deviation. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence bands.  
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Figure 7 
In Figure 7, Panel A we plot impulse response functions (IRFs) for the Risk Premia Differential 
to a unit standard deviation change in a particular variable, traced forward over a period of 12 
months. Response to Cholesky 1 standard deviation. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence 
bands.  
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In Figure 7, Panel B we plot impulse response functions (IRFs) for the Risk Differential to a unit 
standard deviation change in a particular variable, traced forward over a period of 12 months. 
Response to Cholesky 1 standard deviation. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence bands.  
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Figure 8 
In Figure 8, we plot impulse response functions (IRFs) for the Risk Premia Differential and relative delinquency rate to a unit standard 
deviation change in a particular variable, traced forward over a period of 12 months. Response to Cholesky 1 standard deviation. 
Dashed lines represent 95% confidence bands.  
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Figure 9 
In Figure 9, we plot impulse response functions (IRFs) for the Risk Premia Differential (top row) and relative delinquency rate 
(second row) to a unit standard deviation change in a particular variable, traced forward over a period of 12 months. Response to 
Cholesky 1 standard deviation. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence bands. The variables included in the VAR system are: the 
differential risk premia (RISKDIFF), difference in standard deviations (DIFSTDEV), unemployment rate (UNEMPL), percent change 
in forward earnings per share (PCTEPS), and relative delinquency rate (DELINQ). 
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Table 2 
The table shows time series regressions of relative delinquency rate, DELINQ, on several predictors: the differential 
risk premia (RISKDIFF), difference in standard deviations (DIFSTDEV), unemployment rate (UNEMPL), percent 
change (growth rate) in total employment (EMPL), percent change in forward earnings per share (PCTEPS). The 
variables of interest are highlighted in bold. Lagged values of the dependent and independent variables are included 
to control for serial correlation the data. t-statistic is shown in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.  
 
 DELINQ(t) DELINQ(t) DELINQ(t) DELINQ(t) 
Intercept -0.728 
(-2.35)** 
0.158 
(0.92) 
-0.729 
(-2.32)** 
0.126 
(0.69) 
DELINQ(t-1) 0.899 
(10.49)*** 
0.892 
(9.98)*** 
0.894 
(10.23)*** 
0.879 
(9.58)*** 
DELINQ(t-2) -0.084 
(-0.99) 
0.010 
(0.12) 
-0.080 
(-0.93) 
0.010 
(0.12) 
RISKDIFF(-6) 1.146 
(2.01)** 
0.966 
(1.74)* 
1.186 
(2.05)** 
0.997 
(1.76)* 
RISKDIFF(-7) -0.481 
(-0.65) 
-0.301 
(-0.41) 
-0.448 
(-0.59) 
-0.199 
(-0.27) 
RISKDIFF(-8) -0.707 
(-1.22) 
-0.476 
(-0.82) 
-0.761 
(-1.26) 
-0.507 
(-0.84) 
DIFFSTDEV(-4) 0.075 
(1.68)* 
 0.072 
(1.60) 
 
DIFFSTDEV(-5) -0.088 
(-1.48) 
 -0.088 
(-1.45) 
 
DIFFSTDEV(-6) 0.127 
(2.75)*** 
 0.129 
(2.74)*** 
 
DIFFSTDEV(-6)  0.138 
(2.98)*** 
 0.133 
(2.80)*** 
DIFFSTDEV(-7)  0.007 
(0.11) 
 0.010 
(0.16) 
DIFFSTDEV(-8)  -0.106 
(-2.28)** 
 -0.104 
(-2.17)** 
UNEMPL(-8) 0.707 
(1.94)** 
 0.700 
(1.85)** 
 
UNEMPL(-9) -0.100 
(-0.19) 
 -0.089 
(-0.17) 
 
UNEMPL(-10) -0.423 
(-1.12) 
 -0.429 
(-1.09) 
 
EMPL(-9)  -98.65 
(-1.89)** 
 -101.52 
(-1.88)** 
EMPL(-10)  -12.78 
(-0.23) 
 -7.43 
(-0.13) 
EMPL(-11)  -27.50 
(-0.44) 
 -34.90 
(-0.54) 
PCTEPS(-2)   1.081 
(0.50) 
1.611 
(0.76) 
PCTEPS(-3)   -0.270 
(-0.13) 
0.295 
(0.14) 
PCTEPS(-4)   -0.576 
(-0.27) 
-0.168 
(-0.08) 
Durbin-Watson 1.89 1.89 1.89 1.89 
 
***, ***, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
